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MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Korea
Urban Land Development Prolect (Loan 2704-KO)
Attached is a copy of the report entitled "Project Completion Report
on Korea - Urban Land Development Project (Loan 2704-KO)" prepared by the East
Asia and Pacific Regional Office. The Borrower did not provide Part II.
The project exceeded its targets in terms of supply of serviced land.
Institutional development was successful: the required studies were completed and
new procedures established based on their conclusions, and the related training
program was implemented. However, the administrative capacity of the project
entity did not keep up with the rapid growth of its activities. Furthermore, the
project achieved little in relaxing the restrictive regulations which stand in
the way of effective private sector involvement in housing and the provision of
an adequate supply of serviced land.
On balance, the project is rated as satisfactory, its institutional
development impact as partial (due to its limited impact on broader sectoral
objectives), and the sustainability of its policy approach as uncertain, although
the direct benefits of the project are sustained.
No audit is planned.
Attachment
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2704-KO)
Preface
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Korea Urban Land
Development Project, for which Loan 2704-KO in the amount of US$150 million was
approved on May 29, 1986. The last disbursement was made on June 8, 1990 and the
loan was closed earlier than the scheduled closing date of December 31, 1990.
The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure operations Division of the
East Asia and Pacific Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). The
Government did not provide Part II.
Preparation of this PCR was based , inter alia, on the Staff
Appraisal Report, the Loan Agreement, supervision mission reports, correspondence
between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2704-KO)
Evaluation Summarv
Introduction
I. This project was one of a series developed and implemented since 1980
to address th. problems of the Korean housing sector. Bank involvement in this
area began with the National Urban Land Development and Housing Loans I (1980-KO)
and II (2216-KO) of 1981 and 1982, which supported the activities of government
land development and housing production agencies. A later evaluation of the
projects found that while they had met their physical goals, they had set and had
met only limited goals for orienting the country's housing policy. Their impact
on the housing sector was judged to be minimal. A broader sectoral focus was
reflected in two subsequent loans intended to deal with the perceived
"bottlenecks in the housing sector. This project was to deal with the shortage
of serviced land while the Housing Finance Sector Project of 1987 (Loan 2853-KO)
addressed the shortage of housing finance. A final project, the Housing Sector
Loan (3329-KO) of 1991, addresses housing policy as a whole.
Obiectives.
ii. The project was intended to increase the supply of serviced land in
Korea by assisting KLDC in fulfilling its role under the Sixth Economic and
Social Development Plan (1987-1991). Thus, the project supported the
Government's housing sector policy which relied on direct intervention in the
sector. The project had four main objectives:
(a) strengthening KLDC's management and administration;
(b) establishing corporate goals for serving the low-income population;
(c) improving KLDC's project evaluation procedures, and its cost
allocation and pricing policies; and
(d) supporting KLDC's urban land development program.
iii. These objectives were pursued in the project through two major
components. First, an investment component would finance a time slice of KLDC's
land development program. Secondly, an institutional strengthening component
would improve KLDC's site selection and pricing policies as well as its internal
financial management.
iv. Investment Component. The Project would partially finance a four year
time slice (1986-89) of KLDC's land developmnt activities. K.DC's program
required the acquisition of about 2,700 ha of land for housing and 1,000 ha of
land for industrial sites. A total of 3,700 ha of serviced land over 120 sites
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would be supplied. The total cost of KLDC land development activities during
this period was estimated at appraisal as US$1,849 million; Bank financing would
supply US$150 million, or 8% of project costs.
v. Institutional ComDonent. The institutional strengthening program was
intended to deal with a number of deficiencies in planning and internal financial
management identified during the previous projects. The *pecific goals of the
institutional strengthening program were set forth in the Institutional
Development Program which was to be fully implemented by December 31, 1987. The
major goals of this Program were new long-term planning procedures, improved
criteria for physical planning and site selection, improved cost allocation and
pricing policies, computerized accounting and information systems, and a training
policy. To achieve these ends, KLDC financed studies of current practices and
engaged consultant services to improve accounting and management.
ImDlementation ExDerience.
vi. KLDC was more than successful in meeting the goals of the investment
component. Soon after appraisal, KLDC's land development goals under the
Government's housing program were increased. As a consequence, both the area of
land acquired and the investment in land acquisition grew at a more rapid pace
than predicted. By the end of 1989, KLDC had acquired 71,435 Ha., rather than
the 44,853 predicted. While the land development process proceeded at a slower
pace than anticipated, by the end of 1989 both the area developed and the
investment in land development were approximately equal to the original
estimates. By the end of 1990, the area developed was 30% over the predicted
level over the period and expenditures on land development were nearly twice
appraisal.
vii. The cost of KLDC activities was, however, underestimated. The price
of acquired land rose rapidly and averaged Won 348,000 rather than the predicted
Won 264,000. Total expenditure on land acquisition was Won 2,488 billion rather
than the appraisal value of Won 1,183 billion. Although the development process
ran more slowly than expected, costs per ha. were higher, bringing expenditure
on land development during the period to the appraisal estimates. The total cost
of the program rose to US$3,936 million, over twice the original appraisal
estimates.
viii. RLDC also fulfilled all the requirements of the institutional
development program as set forth in both the Policy statement and the Appraisal
Report. The required studies were performed on a timely basis and new procedures
were based on them. Implementation of some systems took longer than anticipated,
but were completed by the end of the project.
Proiect Impact.
ix. KLDC was projected at the time of appraisal to be a major contributor
to the housing goals of the Sixth Economic and Social Development Plan. However,
because of additional responsibilities given to it, KLDC quickly became a more
important institution in the housing sector than anticipated. Between 1986 and
1989, KLDC accounted for 40% of all land development activities in Korea. In
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1989, KLDC was responsible for half of all land development investment.
x. KLDC was notably successful in implementing its institutional
development program. Bank staff played a central role in achieving this result,
providing substantial assistance to the institution on selection of computer
systems and the design of financial procedures. However, the increased
responsibility placed on KLDC in the Government's expanded housing program
strained the institution's managerial and financial capacity. As a consequence,
the performance indicators set to test the success of the program deteriorated.
Administrative costs and staff per ha. of developed land rose as did the level
of inventories. The institution was also forced to become dependent on debt
financing to launch the expanded development program. Nonetheless, KLDC was
extremely profitable during the project period. However, the institution's
profitability was largely due to the continued increase in land prices during the
project period.
xi. KLDC's notable succeso in implementing its institutional development
program and fulfilling its role in the Sixth Economic and Social Development Plan
began to show results by the end of the 1980s. Both the real rate of increase
of land and housing prices and the ratio of housing prices to income have
moderated. In the early 1990., house and land prices began to decline. These
results suggest that the institution has been somewhat successful in reducing the
pressures in the housing sector though not sufficiently to bring prices or sector
conditions to their levels in the 1970s.
xii. However, KLDC's success in fulfilling the objectives of the project
ultimately did little to solve the problem's of the Korean housing sector; the
institution's massive land development program served primarily to counter the
restrictions on the land and housing markets created by the Korean regulatory
environment. These restrictions, which reduced the ability of private land
developers to respond to demand, forced the institution to take on a dominant
role in the land market. But KLDC's declining efficiency under these demands,
despite the good performance of its management in improving procedures and
systems, casts serious doubt both on the ability of one institution to
efficiently fulfill the needs of the Korean housing market and on the general
direct intervention approach. Thus, the regulatory environment forced the
Government to pursue a strategy which was ultimately unsustainable.
Lessons Learned.
xiii. Bank staff can olay an important role in Institutional DeveloDment
Prorams. This project benefitted considerably from the input of Bank staff with
a strong background in managerial and computer systems. It is likely that in
other environments, where such skills are even more rare, such assistance will
be of even greater value.
xiv. The imiact of Institutional Develooment Proorame will be limited in
a counterproductive policv environment, While this project achieved noteworthy
success in improving the managerial capability of the client institution, that
institution operates in a policy environment which forces it to take on a
dominant sectoral role. Such an environment not only makes it difficult for the
client institution to increase its managerial efficiency, but also is ultimately
unsustainable an a solution to sector problems. KLDC will continue to make a
sizeable contribution to the Korean housing sector, but relying on it as the main
actor in a direct intervention strategy places undue burdens on the institution.
Reducing regulatory distortions, as is contemplated in the Housing Sector Loan
approved in 1991, will both reduce the burdens placed on KLDC and set the stage
for sustainable improvements in the Korean housing sector.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Loan 2704-KO)
PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
Proiect Identity
- Project Namet Urban Land Developm nt Project
- Loan No.: 2704-KO
- RVP Unit: East Asia and Pacific Region
- Country Republic of Korea
- Sector: Urban
- Subsector: Housing
A. Introduction
1. This project was one of a series developed and implemented mince 1980 to
address the problems of the Korean housing sector. Bank involvement in this area
began with the National Urban Land Development and Housing Loans I (1980-KO) and
II (2216-RO) of 1981 and 1982 which supported the activities of Goverinnt land
development and housing production agencies. A later evaluation of the projects
found that while they had met their physical goals, they had set and had met only
limited goals for orienting the country's housing policy. Their impact on the
housing sector was judged to be minimal. A broader sectoral focus was reflected
in two subsequent loans intended to deal with the perceived 'bottlenecks in the
housing sector, the Urban Land Development Project of 1986 (Loan 2704-KO) and the
Housing Finance Sector Project of 1987 (Loan 2853-KO). A recent project, the
Housing Sector Loan of 1991 (Loan 3329-KO), addresses housing policy as a whole.
B. Proiect Backargund
2. The Housino Sector and the DOvloment of Korean Housino Polisv. The
portfolio of housing projects cited above is a reflection of the evolution of the
Government of Korea's housing policy and the Bank's role in it. Korean housing
policy has evolved from neglect of the sector through the early 19709 to an
emphasis on direct provision of housing. By the early 1980s, Government policy
had shifted to direct provision of important "inputsm in the construction of
housing, namely, serviced land and long-term finance. The Urban Land and
Housing Finance projects were intended to contribute to this effort. Only
recently has the integral role of policy in the housing sector been given direct
attention in both the Government's and the Bank's strategy for addressing housing
sector problms.
3. Korean development policy has always entailed a high degree of direct
intervention in the economy. During the 1950e and 1960s, economic growth was
financed by steering resources to export industries through directed credit
programs and other mechanisms After a period of rebuilding war damages during
the 1950s, housing was largely neglected until the 1970s.
-2-
4. At that time, the consequences of years of neglect of the housing sector
began to be soon. Economic growth was accompanied by a rapid rate of
urbanization; the urban population grew at an average annual rate of 5.4% from
1960-88, a rate nearly three times that of the total population. By 1988, the
nation was over three quarters urban. However, low investment in urban housing
led to rapid increases in crowding and housing prices. As a response, a housing
policy was formulated in a ten year housing plan and specific sectoral goals were
set in economic planning.
5. These goals were pursued through a large degree of direct Government
intervention in the production of housing and its major inputs. Several major
institutions were created to finance housing (the Korea Housing Bank, KHB), to
develop serviced land (the Korea Land Development Corporation, KLDC) and to build
and finance low income housing (the Korea National Housing Corporation, KNHC, and
the National Housing Fund, NHF). Under the Third Five Year Economic and Social
Development Plan (1972-76), 30% of new housing was created by both national and
local public agencies. In the late 1970s, an effort to "cool' the housing sector
restricted private housing development, thereby giving public institutions a
still more important role.
6. The Bank began discussions with the Korean Government on the possibility
of a housing loan in the late 1970s. By the early 1980s, two loans financing
land developm nt activities of KLDC and housing construction and mortgage lending
through KNHC and NH? (Loans 1980-KO and 2216-KO) had been approved. These two
loans attempted both to improve the operations of the two institutions and to
demonstrate through the Bank-financed portion of their programs the feasibility
of lower plot size and building standards. Later evaluation of these projects
found that while they were largely successful in meeting these goals, they had
little ultimate impact on the housing sector.V
7. Despite the increa-sd emphasis on improving conditions, the Korean housing
sector still displayed signs of a large level of excess demand. By 1985, the
Korean housing price index had reached a level almost eight times its 1974 level
while an index of both construction material and general consumer prices grew at
only half that rate. Thus, housing costs grew at an average annual rate of
approximately 20%--a real rate of increase of 6.53% per year. Evidence suggests
that these trends had a significant impact on affordability despite wage
increases during the same years. The ratio of single family house prices to
incomes, a common measure of housing affordability, doubled during the 1970s from
2.31 in 1976 to 5.64 in 1980. Despite a decline in the early 1980s the ratio
remained high at 4.66. Preliminary research suggests that this problems may have
been even more acute among low-income households.V
)/ See Project Completion Report, First and Second National Urban Land
Development and Housing Projects, Report No. 9723, 1991.
2.1 See Kim, Kyung-Hwan, *Housing Prices, Affordability, and Government
Policies in Korea", Internal Discussion Paper, Asia Regional Series Report
No. IDP 99, The World Bank, July 1991.
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8. By the mid 1980s, the Government had launched a major program to increase
the supply of housing. Two million houses were to bo built during the latter
part of the decade. As attempts were made to formulate a response to housing
sector problems, two factors were identified as the major constraints on housing
supply: inadequate supply of serviced land and housing finance. Both public
land development agencies and housing finance institutions were given ambitious
goals to complete as part of this program. Under the Sixth Plan (1987-91), KLDC
was to provide 4,700 ha of serviced land in 50 municipalities with total
investment of $3,300 million (W 2,750 billion). This constituted an increase of
over 30% over the goals of the Fifth Plan (1982-1986), of 3,540 ha of land in 40
municipalities. It should be noted that the actual investment under the Fifth
Plan-$2,054 million-fell short of this goal.
9. This project (Loan 2704-KO) participated in the expansion of Government
housing programs by supporting the expansion of serviced land development while
the Housing Finance Project (Loan 2853-KO) addressed the deficiencies in the
housing finance system.
C. Proiect Obiectives and DescriDtion
10. This project was intended to increase the supply of serviced land in Korea
by assisting KLDC in fulfilling its role under the Sixth Plan. Thus, the project
supported the Government's housing sector policy which relied on direct
intervention in the sector. The project had four principle objectives:
(a) strengthening KLDC's management and administration;
(b) establishing corporate goals for serving the low-income population;
(C) improving KLDC's project evaluation proe dures, and its cost
allocation and pricing policiese and
(d) supporting KLDC's urban land development program.
D. Prolect Desian and Oraanization
11. These objectives were pursued in the project through two major components.
First, an investment component would finance a time slice of KLDC's land
development program. Secondly, an institutional strengthening component would
improve KLDC's site selection and pricing policies as well as its internal
financial management.
12. Investment Comioonent. The Project would partly finance a four year time
slice (1986-89) of KLDC's land development activities. KLDC's program required
the acquisition of about 2,700 ha of land for housing and 1,000 ha of land for
industrial sites. A total of 3,700 ha of serviced land over 120 sites would be
supplied. The total cost of KLDC land development activities during this period
was estimated at appraisal as US$ 1,849 million; Bank financing would supply US$
150 million, or 8% of project costs.
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13. To simplify loan administration, disbursements would be made only against
civil works contracts of more than US$ 5 million each and 60% of the cost of such
contracts would be reimbursed.
14. Institutional Strenathenina Comoonent. Bank experience with KLDC during
previous projects had identified a number of deficiencies in planning, marketing
and internal financial management. A technical assistance program was degigned
to help the institution improve its *ite selection process, its land pricing
policy, financial planning procedures, and accounting system.
15. During Project Appraisal, it was apparent that there were several problems
in the way land development mites were chosen for development and sold after
development. First, there were several technical deficiencies in the site
selection process. Sites were selected on a "least cost" basis, where cost was
primarily dependent on land acquisition. Little attention was paid to the market
demand in the particular sites. As a result, very large mites were selected in
locations where land was cheap, i.e., far from city centers or in cities were
growth was low. Since there was little demand in these locations, sales were
slow and the inventory of unsold developed land was large. KLDC's site selection
policy had been a source of conflict with other agencies in the previous project
(Loan 1980-KO). In particular, KNHC frequently complained that the KLDC
developed sites in locations where it was difficult to find buyers.
16. Several deficiencies were also noted in the manner in which the selling
price for developed land was calculated. First, development costs were
underestimated; financial expenses of land development, such as the cost of
capital over the development period, were excluded from the selling price
calculations. Second, sale prices did not reflect market values. All land was
sold at the same price, with no differentiation for land in better locations or
with better access to services. These factors contributed to the inventory
problem, since land with a lower market value was effectively overpriced and sold
slowly.
17. Finally, weaknesses were noted in KLDC's long-term financial planning and
accounting systems.
18. The project sought to improve KLDC's management and administration. The
specific goals were set forth in the Institutional Development Program which was
to be fully implemented by December 31, 1987. This program included:
(a) The strengthening of KLDC's financial management
(b) The establishment of improved criteria for physical planning and
site selection;
(c) A review of cost allocation and pricing policies;
(d) The establishment of information systems for project planning and
financial management, and the annual updating of short- and medium-
term corporate plans, including development programs and financial
projectionsl
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(-) The establishment of training programs and the construction of a
training center; and
(f) The establishment of computerized accounting and payroll systems.
19. To achieve these ends, the Bank mandated and KLDC financed studieu of the
institution's current practices and consultant services to improve accounting and
management, etc. The specific services identified for financing at appraisal
were studies of land pricing and financial management, implementation of long-
term financial planning and new site evaluation procedures, computerization of
the payroll and accounting systems, and the establishment of performance oriented
goals and a training center.
E. Proiect Imolementation
20. Investment Component. The level of KLDC investment quickly exceeded the
estimates at the time of appraisal. Now activities, such as the industrial land
development activities of the Korea Water Resources Corporation were transferred
to the institution. Moreover, after appraisal the Government of Korea launched
an ambitious program to build 2 million houses, thereby increasing the pressure
on KLDC to supply serviced land. As early as 1987, KLDC's level of activity
exceeded appraisal estimates by some 40%.
21. As a consequence, both the amount of land acquired and the investment in
land acquisition grew at a more rapid pace than predicted. By the end of 1989,
KLDC had acquired 71,435 ha., instead of the 44,853 predicted. However, the land
development process took longer than expected. The rate at which land area was
developed from 1986 through 1988 fell 30% below the prediction at appraisal.
However, in 1989 and 1990, the area developed displayed a rapid expansion. By
the end of the project in 1989, both the area developed and the investment in
land development were approximately equal to the appraisal estimates. By the end
of 1990, the area developed was 30% over the predicted level over the period and
expenditures on land development were nearly twice those of appraisal estimates.
Land sales also lagged behind the original estimates, not reaching the appraised
level until the end of 1989, though exceeding that prediction in 1990.
22. The cost of KLDC activities was also underestimated. The price of acquired
land rose rapidly and averaged Won 348,000 rather than the predicted Won 264,000.
Total expenditure on land acquisition was Won 2,488 billion rather than the
appraisal value of Won 1,183 billion. Although the development process occurred
more slowly than expected, costs per ha were higher, bringing expenditure on land
development during the period to the appraisal estimates. The total cost of the
expanded land development program rose to Won 3,381 billion, over twice the
estimate at appraisal.
23. Loan disbursements proceeded smoothly. While KLDC had little problem
complying with Bank procurement requirements, minor adjustments were made in
disbursement procedures to help the institution smooth cash flow. The loan was
totally disbursed by June 1990, six months ahead of schedule.
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24. Institutional Development Proaram. KLDC fulfilled all the requirements of
the institutional development program as set forth in both the Policy Statement
and the Staff Appraisal Report. The required studies were performed on a timely
basis and new procedures were based on their conclusions. However, despite these
new procedures, KLDC still had some difficulty reaching the ambitious goals of
the institutional development program.
25. Physical Plannina and Site Selection. A study setting forth new procedures
for site evaluation was completed in 1986 and its recommendations were tested in
1987. KLDC now considers market potential, costs, and expected profitability in
selecting sites. A Project Feasibility Deliberation Committee was formed to
analyze the financial return on projects and a computer program to evaluate the
financial return in various sites was created. However, as of 1989, the program
was still available only in English, thereby limiting it. applicability.
Consequently, market analysis was still under-emphasized in site evaluation.
26. Land oricina policy. A consultant report on plot pricing policy was
presented in early 1987 and its recommendations were adapted to and implemented
in KLDC operations. Sale prices are now based on estimates by certified
appraisers. Thus, land prices should implicitly reflect both locational factors
and local market conditions. The amount of discount given to land sold to other
public agencies also varies by location. However, within projects, there is
still little price differentiation according to location or access to services
for residential plots. Industrial and commercial plots are sold at auction, and
can be assumed to fully reflect such factors.
27. Analysis of development costs have also improved. KLDC cost estimates now
include a financial opportunity cost for carrying land. However, this cost is
calculated using the current rate on 3 month certificates of deposit. This rate
has been controlled since 1985 and is now negative in real terms. By comparison,
the corporate debt market, which would better reflect KLDC's opportunity costs,
is currently paying 18%. Moreover, the continued increase in land prices (until
recently) was sufficient to overcome any carrying costs, and KLDC financial
calculations therefore tended to give less emphasis to such factors.
28. Financial Manaaement. A detailed financial model for planning cash flow
and financial management was prepared in 1986 and implemented in 1987. Long-term
financial plans were being prepared every two years. A study was completed in
1987 providing recommendations on accounting for projects, land, accounts payable
and cost allocation.
29. Computerization. Significant efforts were made by KLDC staff in this area,
though progress was somewhat slower than expected. The computerized accounting
system was not available until 1990. The principal problem encountered was the
difficulty in finding computer equipment and developing software that could be
used in the local language (Hangul).
30. Trainina. A local and overseas training program was established almost
immediately. The training center was established in 1988.
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F. Maior Results of the Proiect
31. Contribution to *uoolv of land develop,ed. LDC was projected at the time
of appraisal to be a major contributor to the houuing goals of the Sixth
Development Plan. However, because of the additional responsibilities assigned
to it (see para. 20), it quickly became a more important institution in the
housing sector than anticipated. Between 1986 and 1989, KLDC accounted for 40%
of all land development activities in Korea. In 1989, KLDC was responsible for
half of all land development investment.
32. Institutional Develooment Proaram. KLDC wan notably successful in
implementing its institutional development program. However, the increased
responsibility placed on KLDC in the Government's expanded housing program
strained the institution's managerial and financial capacity. This factor makes
a clear evaluation of the institutional development program difficult.
33. KLDC's management was strained by the rapid expansion of activities during
this period. Staff and administrative expenses increased substantially under the
ambitious program. Administrative expenses on sales were twice the estimate at
appraisal and in 1989, the number of employees per ha of land under development
was 50% above projections. Inventories of unsold land remained large, although
KLDC officials ascribe this trend to the business cycle of land sales rather than
badly chosen projects. Financial management suffered as well. To finance the
rapid rate of expansion, KLDC had to leverage itself to a greater extent than
predicted. By the end of the project, the debt to equity ratio was well over the
"maximum" permitted at the beginning of the project.
34. Nonetheless, KLDC was extremely profitable during the project period. Net
income on sales averaged over 30% betwaen 1986 and 1989 v Profits were in fact
so high that a public relations campaign was launched to explain the source of
such high income. However, this high rate of profitability was primarily due to
the increase in land sale prices. Gross profits (after administrative and
operational expenses but before interest payments and taxes) remained
substantially above the original estimates, suggesting that the rapid increase
in land prices cushioned the impact of increased managerial and financial
inefficiency. Net income (after interest payments and taxes) was only slightly
greater than that predicted at appraisal, reflecting the increased debt loan of
the institution.
3/ It should be noted that standard accounting practices do not contemplate
the opportunity cost of carrying land, which can be high in the case of a
land development company such as XLDC.
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35. Under such circumstances, evaluating the success of the institutional
development program is difficult. While many of the indicators designed at
appraisal to measure the success of the project worsened, the original
projections did not contemplate the kapid expansion of KLDC's program. It could
also be argued that the institution could not have withstood this rate of growth
without improved managerial capabilities. What is clear, however, is that KLDC
did not benefit from any economies of scale in expanding the size of its
operations.
36. Economic Rate of Return. The economic rate of return on sites partially
financed by Bank funds reflects the high profitability of KLDC. To some extent,
this calculation remains an estimate rather than a true ox post calculation.
Although most of these sites were begun the year before final loan approval, by
the end of 1990 some 35% of the developed land remained unsold. However, if the
remaining land is assumed to be sold in 1992 and only a financial charge on the
value of investment in this land and its development is charged during that year,
the subprojects would yield a rate of return, after inflation, of 17.4 %Y Such
a high rate demonstrates the profitability of KLDC.
37. Imoact on Housing Sector. KLDC's notable success in implementing its
institutional development program and fulfilling its role in the Sixth Economic
and Social Development Plan began to show results by the end of the 1980s. Both
the real rate of increase of land and housing prices and the ratio of housing
prices to income have moderated. In the early 1990s, house and land prices began
to decline. These results suggest that the institution has been somewhat
successful in reducing the pressures in the housing sector though not
sufficiently to bring prices or sector conditions to their levels in the 1970.
38. However, the ultimate impact of the project on the sector is less obvious.
Korean land policy continues to pursue a course which makes it difficult for the
land development system to respond to market demand. Korean land policy is
heavily regulated to achieve a number of economic and social goals, Most
regulations stem from a general conception of land as a "scarce" resource in
Korea, which therefore must be regulated to ensure that it be available for
important uses (such as agriculture) or so that the total population rather than
a few benefit from its development, sale, and use. As the demand for land and its
price have increased, government policies have increasingly been directed towards
blocking "speculative" land transactions. Thus, land policy is based on a series
of goals, each commendable individually, but counterproductive when taken in
combination.
39. The National Land Use Planning Act gives the Ministry of Construction the
power to estimate the amount of land needed for various use categories based on
spatial population and economic trends. It then prepares a national land use
plan which establishes the designated use for nearly all the land in Korea. 
4/ A detailed explanation of these assumptions and the calculations is given
in Annex 1.
j/ See Kim, Kyung-Hwan, Ibid.
40. Residential land development requires conversion from an agriculture use
designation, to urban. In practice, HOC issues conversion permits almost
exclusively to Government agencies except for small projects, reportedly to
prevent private developers from reaping large profits from their land development
activities." (Kim 1991) Land surrounding many major cities may also be subject
to a further level of control if its is designated part of a "greenbelt," that
is, an area in which construction is strictly controlled to contain the growth
of urban areas. The total land area inside the greenbelts was 5,397 sq km as of
1988, or about 5.5% of the total land area of Korea.
41. Finally, fear of excessive returns from speculation has led Korean
authorities to put restrictions on land transactions. Permits are required for
large land transactions. The Government has the power to intervene over prices
when a transaction has been judged "speculative." As a consequence, the
Government exercises considerable control over the price, location, and timing
of land development.
42. The net result of these regulations has been a significant barrier to entry
for private land developers. The creation of KLDC has to some extent functioned
as a partial corrective for the extent of regulatory barriers. Since most
permits must be obtained from a Central Government institution in Seoul, KLDC has
a comparative advantage in surmounting regulatory barriers. Thus, the regulatory
environment has been a major factor in KLDC's emergence as the dominant force in
land development. However, even KLDC has encountered difficulty in dealing with
the extent of land regulation. Half of the sites proposed by KLDC since 1980
have been rejected by other agencies.
43. The final irony of Korean urban policy is that regulations designed to
protect land may actually be increasing its scarcity. Regulations impeding the
redevelopment of inner city land have slowed the production of high-density
housing in cities such as Seoul, thereby increasing the pressure to expand into
suburban and rural areas. KLDC itself operates in a manner which does not use
land "efficiently," since the agency sets aside 40% of each development project
for roads and public spaces, a high percentage by international standards. Thus,
not only in the supply of regulatory land restricted by the regulatory
environment, but the number of housing units created per sq km developed is also
restricted.
44. By the end of the project, the importance of the regulatory environment as
the chief problem in the land and housing market had become increasingly obvious
to both Bank staff and Korean officials.
45. The Government of Korea has now demonstrated its growing recognition that
regulatory complexity may become a barrier to land development by introducing
some measures to streamline the permit process. Bank staff have participated in
this process through the policy dialogue in the Housing Sector Project (Loan
3329-KO), which seeks to deal with the total regulatory environment.
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G. Proiect Sustainabilitv
46. KLDC performed well in the role assigned to it by the Government as the
primary supplier of serviced land. However, the strains which have shown in its
management during the course of this project make the sustainability of the
current approach doubtful. Under the 2 million houses program the Government hag
been able to arrest the rate of growth of land and housing prices seen over the
past 20 years. Nonetheless, these trends have yet to be reversed. The
performance of KLDC during the 1980. suggests that, even if the Government could
find the resources to finance greater expansion of its housing program, even a
well-managed institution like KLDC could not single-handedly manago the level of
land development needed. Ultimately, the direct intervention approach is
unsustainable.
H. Bank and Borrower Performance
47. Bank and KLDC staff collaborated closely during the design and
implementation of this project. KLDC achieved noteworthy results in pursuing its
institutional development program. Bank staff were closely involved in the
implementation of the managerial and computer systems, often displaying
considerable skill as "adjunct consultants" to the project. Staff aided KLDC in
overcoming the problems associated with translating software into Hangul and
finding appropriate computer equipment. Staff also helped evaluate the financial
models developed for KLDC. Thus, Bank staff were extremely useful in helping the
institution evaluate and implement consultant recommendations.
I. LESSONS LEARNED
48. Bank staff can olav an important role in Institutional Development
Proaram This project b-nefitt-d considerably from the input of Bank staff with
a strong background in managerial and computer systems. It is likely that in
other environments, where such skills are even more rare, such assistance will
be of even greater value.
49. The imoact of Institutional Dev*loam=nt Pro rams will be limited in a
counteroroductive oolicv environment, While this project achieved noteworthy
success in improving the managerial capability of the client institution, that
institution operates in a policy environment which forces it to take on a
dominant sectoral role. Such an environment not only makes it difficult for the
client institution to increase its managerial efficiency, but also is ultimately
unsustainable as a solution to sector problems. KLDC will continue to make a
contribution to the Korean housing sector, but relying on it as the main actor
in a direct intervention strategy places undue burdens on the institution.
Reducing these regulatory distortions, as is contemplated in the Housing Sector
Project (Loan 3329-KO) approved in 1991, will both reduce the burdens placed on
KLDC and set the stage for sustainable improvements in the Korean housing sector.
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Annex I
Rate of Return Calculations
Calculations of the rate of return was based on the actual costs and sales
price, associated with Bank-financed subprojects. Both the costs and the
benefits (i.e., sales prices) associated with the subprojects were deflated by
the CPI. These data are detailed in the attached table. Since approximately 25%
of the land developed in these sites remained in inventory at the end of 1991,
it was assumed that the remaining unsold land would be sold on Dec. 31, 1992.
A financial cost, calculated by applying a 3% real interest rate to the
investment in inventory, was applied over 1992. These calculations yielded an
estimated return of 17.4%.222
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Ecoornoc Ras of RAtum Cdakuoae
Oefld 1 8n 1
COeA Inflstion C."a. Sam of Delaked NM Deflated Econonic
Land AcquaWon CO Prie KIdex I land' Bnli I Btit Rate
and Dev _'het 1985-100 1966l-100 of Retum
1966 238.857,000 102.1 100 2386857.000 I 0 0 (238,857.000) 0.174
1967 144,437.000 105.9 103 140,206,910 I0 0 (140.208,910)
1966 775.318,134 113.4 110 702.145.716 j 46.737,155 42,38.427 I (U0.477.289)
190 530.700,286 110.9 117 455.012.422 209.843,857 248,506.60 (206.505.762)
1900 534.044,512 130.2 127 421,657,264 I 1.502.862600 1.186,584.236 I 764.926.974
1991 301.678.111 144.9 141 214.026.983 I 707.189.235 501,718,795 I 287,691,812
1992' 49.503.248 144.9 141 35.120.316 1.650.108.215 1.170.677.188 1,135,556,872
in a emuend Won
*-Elmatsd
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Seas tinancad undw w th.ro IBRO Pron.t (2704-KO1
SUat" as of D.c. 31. 198e (mn tousano Won)
Acquesion Construcoon Overhead Total Sales Cost Of
Land Sold P oft Inventonsa
I Kin ha-Eobang 13,232,000 3,464,000 0 16.696,000 0 0 
0 16.666.000
2 Suw.on-Maan 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Inchon-Namdong nd. 29,969,000 S680,000 0 36,649,000 0 0 
0 36,649,000
4 S.oul-ungg 70,653.000 35.000,000 0 105,653,000 0 
0 0 105.653.000
S Chonglu-4okdai 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0
6 Chunglu-Cloongaue 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0
7 Kyongsan-knd- 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0
S Pohang Iron Ind. 11 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0
9 Pohang Irtn Ind. IV, V 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0
10 GIwangi-Hanalnd. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0
11Usawn4anho 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0
12 Daeduck Housing Site 1 5,637,000 243,000 0 5,60,000 0 0 
0 580,1000
13 DmaUck Houawg Ste 11 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0
14 D&aSuck e91 1 4,000 58.000 0 62,000 0 
0 0 U2.000
5 Oa.ouck S9AO11 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0
16 Ina lII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0
17 Songtan In. 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0
18 Ky.onu Yongg Ind. 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0
19 1 _uba,t)0 IrLd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0
20 Inckl.on-Y.onu 12.670.000 179,000 0 12,649,000 
0 0 0 12,849,000
21 Oaepon-OOon,n eo.794,000 274.000 0 61.066.000 0 
0 0 61,086,000
22 Churchlon-Soghs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 Chuncheon-Ho0)yongl1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0
24 JOnju-Sawnchwof 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0
25 Gunsan ndc 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0
26 G.anglu-anam Housng Site 11 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0
192,959,000 45,896,000 0 238,857,000 0 0 0 2368,657.000
- 14 -
S., finsec4 under Me th t IBMR Pvoscat (2704-KO)
SaINNS as Of O.c. 31, 1907 (in Utoussnd Wonl
Acqusibon Con4suetton Ovedt Tota Sal" Cot f Pafit Inntony
landt Scid1 KJmhae-Eobsng (60,000) 2.262.000 0 2.202,000 0 0 0 0 2.202.0002 Sucon-astan II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 03 Inchon-Namdong Inc. 11,079,000 16,956.000 0 26,037,000 0 0 0 0 26.037.0004 SeouIunqgg 3,525,000 4,426,000 0 7.951,000 0 0 0 0 7,951.0005 ChongiuBekd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Chungiu-Choongeu 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
7 Ky-isian-toniNg 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
8 Pohang ron inct. III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 09 Ponang l'on na IVV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 GwsngjIu-&sn4m inc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 UIn-S,mno 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 DaOduck Hcusng S4t I 2.906,000 1,147,000 0 4,055.000 0 0 0 0 4,05'.00013 Dasduck Housing SitN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 014 Oseduck Sit 32,745,000 116,000 0 32,666,000 0 0 0 0 32,t66.0005 Doduck SlbtsN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 6 In Inct. N 2.052,000 116,000 0 2.166,000 0 0 0 0 2,166.00017 Songtw Ind, 3.000 146,000 0 149,000 0 0 0 0 149,00016 Kyscnglu Yonggang tnd. 5.000 90.000 0 95,000 0 0 0 0 95.00019 U"afPOV5dhtmiW Indc 0 28,000 0 26.000 0 0 0 0 28.00020 Inchon-Yconwu 26,378.000 50.000 0 26,426,000 0 0 0 0 26.42t1.,00021 Dateon-Oconsn 40,42t.000 30,000 0 40.456.000 0 0 0 0 40.45t,00022 Chtiuncnhon-Smgsa 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
23 Chunchon-Hoopyong 1i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 024 J*onu*Sarnc.hon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 Gunsan ind 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 Gangju-Hanasn rousung S.te II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
'19.068.000 25.371.000 0 144.437 00W 0 0 0 0 144.437,000
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Stag hnanced undM VW third ISRD Pro*ct 27O4-KO)
Seta. asdoDec, 31, 198S
Devo wit Comb #In thousand Won)
Acquion Co nacin Ovwtd Tota Sal4s cost of Proit In
Land Sold
t Kimhil0bang 13.380,129 7,512.750 2.937 21,139,616 0 21,139,616
2 SuweonnMean 11 32.036.015 9.477,809 253,385 41,787,209 39.723,750 27.660,336 12.034,414 14,077,673
3 Incnon-Naniong Ino 72.769.220 56.353,091 1,604,s5 130,946,66 0 0 0 130.041,869
4 Seoul..nggam 75,606.716 19,652,O03 1.206.033 6.4s4.752 0 0 0 96.464,752
5 Ch.ongju-coas 16,197.434 4.16.O56 266746 22.664,240 407,421 434,752 (27.331) 2=20,4111
6 Chung-Choongue 9,01.o343 4.260526 162.048 13.543,619 806.065 3,161,753 3.444,2=2 10.362,166
7 Kyeangsn4mdang 9,8S6285 270.299 l22520 10.253,113 0 0 0 10,253,113
6 Pohang Iron Ind. Ml 2.163M70 3.266,803 106614 5.m5'3177 0 0 0 5,553,177
9 Pohang Iron Ind. IV, V 2965S71 7,310242 177.62 10,543,442 0 0 0 10,543,4.42
10 GwamMu-Manam Ind. 18,745,937 14,252 1SW 556.64 3358,071 0 0 0 33,554,971
11 Ulsan-Srmho 12.51 942 6,651,340 275,012 10,64.94 0 0 0 19,646.194
12 D"duck HousingSitJI 6,777.62 1,6.659 111.148 10o7,2.666 0 0 0 o 1075s2.6
13 Oeduck Hlousing St 44.029.6s7 3,471,569 60561 46.195,447 0 0 0 46,165.447
14 ODeduck Sie I 56,50206s 16,06912 1,006,329 75.575,307 0 0 0 75,575.307
I5 Decluck Sit II 83,131,735 7.967.381 1.066,662 92,166.076 0 0 0 926N.078
i6 in Id. 11 5.293024 1,409,722 81.5092 8.74,336 0 0 0 6,784,338
17 Songta Ind. 16.213,206 335,12 266,101 18,817,501 0 0 0 18,817,501
18 Kyoonglu Yonguhl nd. 11.123,535 782.474 172,733 12,076.742 0 0 0 12.078.742
Il Usan-Peoc imic Ind 6,479.575 212.036 97,056 6,766,667 0 0 0 6.768.667
20 Inchwon-Yeonsu 164.729.686 695,274 2.440,706 168.8.956 0 0 0 166,065.956
21 Oaeteon-Ooorsan 274.358.507 69.322 4,279.473 279.334,362 0 0 0 279.334.362
22 Chunnenon-Sogta 8.138,145 124.516 119,635 8.362,4s6 0 0 0 6.382.406
23 Chuncheon-HoopyongIl 801,956 17,545 11,887 631,380 0 0 0 o31,368
24 34onju-Samcm.on 13,595,4i9 206,654 200,279 14,006352 0 0 0 14,002.352
25 Gunsnindn 4,777 3,416 l19 6,314 0 0 0 8,314
26 Gvangju4Haam MHoung Ss al 10,483.363 96,116 149,317 10.728.111 0 0 0 10.728,818
Total 973,018.377 160,64S.901 15,947,656 1,156,1.134 46,737.156 31,285,841 15,451,315 1,127,326,293
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SO" hn&nC. unCe mW mud gSD Ploea t2704-K01
Sus as ofec. 31 699
Deeo9mnt Co6 im monhsam Won) Cogs dl
Acqwsutn Conruwson O0h To Se Land Sold Prdll en
1 IU OdEo 13,920,319 8.341.027 264.217 2.525.563 0 0 0 22.5t3
2 Suwoln-Ma*t 32.036,015 9,477,809 253,385 41,767,209 5.067,604 38.467,529 156a00.375 5.26.
3 hndNamdorg id. 78,814,597 75,35,1 12 1,877,07 156, 126796 64,90so204 56,473143 28.430,0611 66.663.65
4 9ouq ng_ 76,307,214 43,279.91 662.672 120.446,677 13227.3306 t6.657.037 45.921 Xt 33.x7S40
5 Ch awMuklkda 18.197,434 4.180,051 266748 22e4,240 24,70.63 19.752,425 5.1161,6 3.011,815
6 oCim o e o 9,061,343 4,260528 192.048 13e543.919 17,36733 10.081,8" 7.313.646 3.492.31
7 Ky.ongan4nde 10.270.256 655.449 126,95 11.052.861 0 0 0 11.05t2.l
e Pohwng Ironnd. IN 2.173.090 5.972.957 141,183 8,217.230 7,162.972 6,677.172 505.o8 1.610,06
9 Poh.niren 4. PiV,V 2.965,571 9,796,302 172.621 12,954494 0 0 0 12.6t464
10 G.&Mfiu4ftnw Ind. 18,835,201 17.318.561 573,561 36,725,323 17,652301 14,643,356 3,206,642 22.0111,64
II UWan-Semho 12,791.403 8,879.536 299,729 21970.670 0 0 0 21s70,670
12 roediuck Mdue"Si1A 8,822.332 1,931.129 111,882 10.865.343 0 0 0 10,6.343
13 0ooduck Hmo. Sloe, 48,867.6s53 5,000.562 730,728 54.599.163 0 0 0 54,56.163
14 DekducuSilt I 56,653,226 19,397.174 1,014,205 77.064,606 0 0 0 77,0t4,805
15 Oasduck Sit 92304,641 22,11Ie042 1.078,946 115.486.629 0 0 0 115,400,M26
16 Inind.l 5,768,961 5,295,096 104,109 11,166,196 0 0 0 11.16196e
17 Sontn hid. 2070,4e6 2.756,219 232363 25.061,06o 0 0 0 25.061,000
16 Kyeorngu Y ga Ind. 12.291,629 3,645,237 200,657 16337,523 0 0 0 1.337.523
1 L6gw,-eaochemi" Ind. 8,563.990 7,176.753 156.831 15,917,574 0 0 0 15.817,574
20 ahmcaYooru 196.917,86o 15,193,241 2.468,346 204,56640 0 0 0 204.566460
21 Deslo _.Oooruan 567,170,935 8.750,553 6,453,536 612.375,026 0 0 0 S1z375.026
22 Chunchdon-Seg.a 15,061,096 1,547,449 152.293 16.76040 0 0 0 1t,760,t40
23 Chwch uO _t p8ong 6,551,281 245,593 54.955 6,651.629 0 0 0 8,6e1.829
24 eonjSa,ueon 32.017,427 2635071 337,882 34,960,390 0 0 0 34,O0360
25 GOunmn lnd. 229,092 4,364,438 32,864 4,628.414 0 0 0 4,86.414
26 GWenU-HMwn Houeng 8s4 11 10.492.343 1.S71 857 160,4W 12.525,046 0 0 3 12525.046
Toul 1,381.025.939 289,925.766 18,360.715 I,689,312,420 336,581,013 230.782.553 05,796,460 1,456,529.N67
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sit, financed unaxr iS thsra Pvoect (2704-K(0
StA e do Dec. 31, ig9o
DOveopment Cosi (in tousand Won)
Acqution Consmeuctlon Oveead Total Sale Cost od Protlt Inveoil
land olt
1 Kknha&Aobw* 13,985,281 11,411.350 312869 25,786.520 35,361,257 21.376,434 13.714.523 4,210.066
2 Su_mon-Mastan u 32.03ao1i5 9477,89 253,385 41.787.206 56,484,150 38,872.275 17,501,675 2.694,934
3 Inchon-Namdong Id. 81,904.073 986332.076 2,261.917 180.488.066 369,552.175 180,199,761 200.35Z414 20,2191.305
4 Ssoul-Junggs 80,178.843 4s.o09.223 818.743 129.093,80o 174,642,291 106,100,6G6 66,541,8e2 20.603120
5 Ch.ongju-Boflad 18.197.434 4.180,058 286.745 22,S64.240 27,987,362 21,773.498 6.193,884 aso,742
6 ChuNu-ChOongauBs 9.061.343 4.260.528 192,048 13.543.910 19,484,9691 11.584.6685 7.900.264 1,W9,234
7 Kyoeosn-Idwl o0,414,061 854,893 le6,5s2 11,437,526 2,678,096 2,611,455 18,641 8776o71
8 Pouang on Ind. III 2173.090 5,972,957 141,183 8,287,230 9,062.979 8,134,548 92S.430 152.861
9 Pohng iron In. N, V 3,.sz702 12.370.982 199,908 15.833.572 1.654,782 54s,836 1.104,48 15.03736
10 Gwanglu.Mawn Ind 18,S35,201 17,316,581 573.581 30.725.323 23,931,283 19,269,471 4.641,812 17.438852
11 Uan-Senho 35,53i.617 11,025,448 325,419 46.6,z484 44,587.166 33,090,143 11,497,023 IV72.341
12 Oagouck Housng S6I 9,238,787 12464,068 178.362 21,877,238 211,61,410 21,801,454 (140.044 75.764
13 Deeduck Housing Sim I 13.845.8s2 6,25.829 257.870 20,529,387 45,396,798 16,041836 29,356,982 4,487,551
14 Oeeduck Skt I 3125,4685 6,164.903 619,265 ".909.633 35,377,423 22.987,094 12,360,329 21,921.539
I 5Oeeuck SM 11 52.z67,220 1g,723,388 1.185,307 73,575,915 68,545,726 54,459,037 15.066e8 19,118.878
16 InInd. I 123.537,423 30,317.772 (Z291.315) 11.563.S80 121.518.110 114,464,572 7,06a536 37,009.306
17 Songtan Ind. 5.798.544 7.105.328 147,054 13.048.6 10,139,864 5.867,380 4.27Z,524 7,181.566
18 KyeongjuYonggwugfd 1Z3.153 4,520.028 211,893 17,125.074 10,013,942 7,868,130 Z 14.812 9,25,944
19Lft_n-Phlrochaniseall In 22.874,173 11,132.80 318.948 34.125,927 80,893,753 30,213,161 30,610,S2 3,911S.7
20 lnchlon-YVo,ws 200,039.572 47,230,422 3,075,364 250,345,358 18a1.10.090 147.824,153 33.283.937 1Z0521.205
21 eeeonOonan s882787,791 34,923.s23 8,627,94 926,339.382 322,004,488 281,260.991 40.723.477 645,058.371
22 Chuncheon-Seogla 19.857,213 3,091,731 234,647 23a183,591 2. 173.570 22.705.855 3.467,923 477,936
23 Chuncneon-Hoopyong u 1,930,457 2.936.153 180.857 15.047.267 10,837,448 9,908.9 930,527 5,140,345
24 Jeon1u-SacnCin 32,213.934 6,570.752 421.903 39,206.589 48.711,868 3.,723,927 14.987.941 
5,482,882
25 Gunsanin 5.533.962 16.351.363 490.306 22,375.631 11.380.360 10.490,250 890,110 11,985.361
26 Gwwnu-HaWwn Housing Site II 10,538.190 26.865.932 379,134 37.783.256 99,22.444 27,308.242 71.974.202 10.475,0140 0
0 0
Toata 1,748,367.248 457,399.984 19.569,702 z223.35s.932 I.9,433,813 1,232,775,580 6o0.a58.233 960,581,352
J
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S_m mom" wa w tUf m R W Pa cS C27044O
Stm"dt fOmc 31, 1991
0mq4com.,t Comb 4Ir moumand Won)
ACqUieoen ConmaUcn Ovetread Toal S_im Cost ofP rt fbI
lba maid
1 ilmEabang 13,903.201 11,466,350 312,690 25,766520 37,356,746 2Z29386791 14,421.955 2,549,729
2 SuvMon.Mmtn U 32.036.013 9.477,06 253,396 41,767.209 59,255,306 40.571,300 17,60U09 1,195,9D9
3 lenaNmmdong Ind. 609.17 133.503.403 2,UIU6 2¶9,457,196 40.718.133 199.606.806 251,029,327 19,770,390
4 Ueau.Jug9w g0.178.6. 46.0966.23 614743 129,03.609 i60,202364 110,321.043 60,011.341 1l,77Z766l
5 Chuo au-8aim is 197,434 4,160,056 26,746 2554.240 29,748,934 22.500,707 6,248.227 163,533
* _ChuigpClwonge 9,091,343 4.260,52 19a.046 13,543.010 20.450,570 12.463436 7.976132 1,060,461
7 KVyeow4p&a4,ng 11.6w3,10 911e466 175,732 12,726109 2915.365 3,019,417 M014,01w 9.707.301
S Pohang tow ltd. t 2.173,090 5.972.957 141,163 6,297,230 9.01I.972 6,134,546 926423 152.611
9 Pahg ie Wnd. IV, V 3,60,366 13.014,178 206L546 1l6.2,096 20,530,54 12074.664 8.485.750 4,751,212
10 Gufu4ftam Ind. M.3A201 17,316.561 573,561 36L725,323 36,160,653 27,362.36 10,797.715 9.34Z385
11 ULfta.Iaa,ho 30.522.376 11,772.871 300.9U6 46,596,235 47,319,160 35,210,644 12.056.16 13335.901
12 Oasduck lmli 6ft1 10.004,903 14,457.272 1995.8 24e01,622 23.427,984 24.U1,91 2 (1,2338.6 1
13 Oaeduck lcoung Of N 13,6482 6.65229 257,676 20.529,367 62.03t.479 19.473,362 42,55.097 1,0586008
14 04mduk*SPAl 72.71V.258 9,180.297 (2,161,533) 79.664,019 56475.36 29,575,929 27,m.9459 51,066,090
15 Oeedurk SWI 52357,220 19,723,366 1,165,307 73,575,915 76244,092 58A357,234 17,U67,686 15216,681
Is mb ld 13366A7.140 4 04,422 1,02,048 111.466,607 121,044,634 129.757,063 1,297.541 54,711,514
17 So dm A9. 5.6405 7,130,006 9,674 IZ906J.75 16,514.680 10.2U,66 6,231.991 2706.307
16 Kyeoag.u Yonqgg and. 12,303.153 4.520,02 211,093 17,125.074 15.163,976 12Z172,490 3.011,476 4.952,576
19 U _hMA-POVocnmicallad. 22.674,173 11.132,006 316.946 34,125.927 66.6,916 32.666,5a6 33,N00,352 1,437,361
20 Ilncheo-Ysonu 215388.510 73.9066.24 3.574.579 292.629,913 297796745 214,183.797 5,5.946 78.646116
21 0 _msmca-O0oan 1186,073.131 79.415.92 9,000.760 977,497,633 657,870.816 420.370,925 237,469,6 557,126.901
22 Couanceon.Smag 20.291,620 6.297.421 275.693 26,654,934 31,000,315 26.657,423 4,432,092 197.511
23 Chun0o _on-ioopyong 11 ,944,224 4.041.129 I16075 16.1661427 13.241.458 11,204,566 2,036.670 4.963.3
24 .Gu-SnCheW 32.468,364 9,418,414 454754 42,339,582 6,6.23,366 42.100.965 26,432.423 147,567
25 Guamwnwd, 76.724.116 31,723779 1.496,919 111.947.616 40.731.69 56.691.615 (la.01,156 53.056,001
29 GWmagu44wn am Mousn SPA N 10.53l,190 29,66,932 379,134 37,763,256 125,366.607 30,417.465 94,940,342 7,365,791
Total 1.91,577687 610.931,962 22,525.414 2,525,035.043 2.546.623,046 1.611.25864 S,3434 9137359
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PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
Not Available.
KORE
URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2704-KO)
PART III - STATISTICAL INFORMATION
1. Related Bank Loans
Loan/Credit Purpose Year of Status Comments
Approval
LN 1980-KO To provide housing for low-income families and to 04/30/81 Completed. PCR No.
National Urban further develop the capabilities of the major 8689 of
Land Development public institutions serving the housing sector, 05/23/90
and Housing I namely Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) and PPAR
and Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC). No. 9723
The objectives to be pursued in the context of an of
ongoing dialogue on housing policy issues between 06/23/91
the Bank and the Korean Government was through the have been
technical assistance and housing sector study. issued.
LN 2216-KO To advance the Bank/Government dialogue on sector 12/14/82 Completed. PCR No.
National Urban policy and programs and thus (a) assist in 8689 of
Land Development rationalizing and strengthening the housing and 05/23/90
L Housing II land development institutions in the public and PPAR
sector; (b) support the development of the No. 9723
National Housing Fund (NHF) as a viable financial of
intermediary with capacity for project appraisal 06/23/91
and supervision; and (c) support investments in have been
the policies and programs for delivering housing issued.
to lower income families by financing the
development of land and housing by KLDC and KNHC.
LN 2853-KO To support measures designed to expand the Housing 06/23/87 Completed.
Housing Finance Finance System over time and increase it PCR
Sector effectiveness in improving housing conditions, prepared.
especially for the lower-income population. The
project to support a two-year (mid-1987 through
mid-1989) time slice of the ongoing reform of the
lending program of the National Housing Fund (NHF)
by providing: (a) sub-loans to eligible borrowers
(Korea National Housing Corporation, local
governments, and private contractors) for
construction financing to be converted into long-
term mortgages for about 210,000 low-income owner-
occupied and rental units for households below the
average urban income level; and (b) consultant
services for assistance in carrying out studies.
LN 3329-KO To support the government's housing sector 05/23/91 Project Project
Housing Sector strategy by providing resources through the under became
National Housing Fund for lower-income housing and execution. effective
by assisting the government in formulating a 10/16/91.
framework for housing policy development and an
agenda for policy reform in the sector. The
government's housing policy objectives are to
target public housing assistance in terms of the
needs of the recipients and to minimize the cost
of providing the assistance, while improving
regulation of the sector in order to increase the
efficiency of housing services.
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2. Proiect Timetable
ACTIVITYr/VENT DATF PLAINED DATF REVISED DATE ACTUAL
Project November 26 -
Identification December 12, 1984
Preappraisal
Mission November 4, 1985
Appraisal
Mission November 4, 1985 December 2, 198S Nov. 11-28, 1985
Negotiations March 15, 1986 February 1986 April 7-9, 1986
Board Approval June 24, 1986 March 1986 May 29, 1986
Loan Signing July 14, 1986
Loan
Effectiveness September 9, 1986
Completion Date December 31, 1989 December 31, 1989
Closing Date December 31, 1990 June 8, 1990
Final
Disbursement June 8, 1990
Final Loan
Account June 14, 1990
Closing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _
3. Loan Disbursements
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements
(US$ Killion)
Appraisal Actual am Actual as
FY Semester Estimate Actual % of % of
Amount Amount Appraisal Loan Amt.
1987 12/31/86 12.0 11.89 99.1% 7.9%
06/30/87 15.0 19.19 127.9% 12.8%
1988 12/31/87 33.0 28.33 85.8% 18.9%
06/30/88 53.0 52.05 98.2% 54.0%
1989 12/31/88 74.0 81.01 109.5% 68.8% a
06/30/89 98.0 103.15 105.3% 92.5% w
1990 12/31/89 122.0 138.72 113.7% 100.0% 1
06/30/90 137.0 150.00 109.5%
1991 12/31/90 150.0
Note: With the final disbursement on June 8, 1990, the loan account was closed on June 14, 1990, six months
prior to the original loan closing date of December 30, 1990. US$ 150,121,080.12 was disbursed against civil
works, i.e. 60% of the KLDC's expenditures. US$ 121,080.12 was deducted to represent the exchange rate
fluctuation for transactions made under Special Account.
4. Proiect Implementation
a) Monitoring Indicators - Appraisal
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Land Acq.- 000 sq meters 14,511 11,714 15,456 11,475 11,095 11,581 10,692 11,563 12,522 13,576
Land D-v.- 000 sq meters 7,395 7,279 7,523 9,914 10,129 9,170 9,277 9,153 9,514 10,465
Land ReDev.- 000 eq meters 0 0 0 17 13 12 12 12 10 10
Land Supply- 000 sq meters 13,774 22,727 21,635 13,071 13,997 13,118 12,832 12,673 12,739 13,410
Land Acq.- Billion Won 88.379 141.712 278.890 235.535 268.884 313.126 387.462 435.029 515.020 609.720
Land Dev.- Billion Won 45.197 51.795 72.165 91.041 91.484 90.585 99.124 107.751 120.841 139.571
Land Redev.- Billion Won 0.266 14.348 7.892 12.000 6.840 7.000 7.360 7.728 8.090 8.495
Land Supply- Billion Won 209.674 336.726 357.552 486.565 507.076 546.805 616.623 658.444 803.180 ERR
Land Sold - Billion Won 103.780 72.321 81.150 76.413 59.931 70.954 92.437 75.742 102.529 85.467
1 Days Acc. Receivable 122 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Number of Employees 820 869 959 992 990 983 966 990 1,027 1,080 >
t incream e of Fmployees 6.0% 10.4% 3.4% -0.2% -0.7% -1.8% 2.4% 3.8% 5.2%
Employ-ee/Mill. sq m Dcv. 110.2 119.4 127.5 99.9 97.6 107.1 104.0 108.0 107.8 103.2
Debt Service Ratio 1.7 2.7 5.3 4.3 1.9 5.3 4.5 8.4 6.7 9.0
Debt Fqulty Ratio 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
% Debt on Debt + Equity 55.6% 56.7% 48.3% 43.5% 32.9% 29.7% 26.1% 23.2% 19.5% 16.8%
Gross Income on Sales 18.5% 26.9% 44.8% 35.4% 31.6% 32.5% 30.4% 31.2% 30.8% 30.8%
Operating Inc. on Sales 12.9% 23.2% 42.9% 33.5% 29.7% 30.7% 28.7% 29.4% 29.1% 29.2%
Inc. before Tax on Equity 4.7% 15.8% 36.0% 24.8% 18.2% 19.9% 17.1% 17.3% 16.8% 16.8%
Net Income on Sales 9.1% 20.5% 36.3% 29.3% 23.7% 28.8% 26.3% 29.1% 28.0% 29.2%
Sales on Inventories 18.5% 21.5% 38.2% 39.2% 39.3% 39.5% 40.2% 38.9% 41.0% 40.8%
Personnel/Field S. Cost 2.047 1.939 1.796 1.843 1.865 1.897 1.950 1.929 1.887 1.827
Adminis. Expenses on sales 5.6% 3.7% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6%
% Contrib. to Cap.Expenditures 44.4% 56.6% 78.2% 90.9% 56.3% 97.8% 92.1% 96.3% 97.1% 96.9%
4. Proiect Implementation
b) Monitoring Indicators - Actual
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Land Acq.- 000 sq meters 14,523 11,547 15,371 11,605 15,004 13,794 31,032 50,270
Land D-v.- 000 sq meter. 7,808 7,916 8,923 6,774 6,965 8,069 13,607 26,111
Land ReDev.- 000 *q meters 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land Supply- 000 sq meters 13,519 20,031 15,097 18,282 23,612 15,247 29,071 36,740
- Residential- 000 sq m 5,737 4,552 5,033 6,759 8,765 7,080 21,038 19,126
Land Acq.- Billion Won 179.956 268.377 348.397 266.796 371.301 549.527 1,797.4402,485.926
Land Dev.- Billion Won 57.932 46.833 69.883 94.519 98.426 127.469 164.512 506.288
Land Redev.- Billion Won 0.000 0.117 0.223 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.265 5.670
Land Supply- Billion Won 201.937 328.317 350.530 530.809 661.725 804.0292,776.0703,529.844
Land Sold - Billion Won 119.936 181.023 399.465 327.860 380.407 479.450 713.319 873.020
MANAGEiMNT
# Days Account Receivable. 122 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Number of Employees 820 - 994 991 1,091 1,271 1,848 2,231
% increase # of Employees - - -0.3% 10.1% 16.5% 45.4% 20.7%
1mployees/Mill. sq m Dev. 110.2 - 111.4 146.3 156.6 157.5 135.8 85.4
Ln
FINANCIAL
Debt Service Ratio 1.7 2.7 5.3 4.3 n.a. 3.6 2.7 n.a.
Debt Service Ratio 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.6 2.7 1.7 n.a.
% Debt on Debt + Equity 55.6% 56.7% 48.3% 59.4% 61.3% 73.1% 63.6% n.a.
Gross Income on Sales 18.5% 26.9% 44.8% 35.4% 35.0% 36.5% 40.8% 23.9%
Operating Inc. on Sales 12.9% 23.2% 42.9% 33.5% 31.9% 33.0% 37.6% 23.2%
Inc. before Tax on Equity 4.7% 15.8% 36.0% 24.8% 17.2% 22.6% 26.8% 48.2%
Net Income on Sales 9.1% 20.5% 36.3% 29.3% 21.4% 29.1% 27.9% 16.7%
Sales on Inventories 18.5% 21.5% 38.2% 39.2% 29.5% 29.7% 27.7% 112.4%
Personnel/Field Staff Cost 2.047 1.939 1.796 1.843 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Adminis. Expenses on Sales 5.6% 3.7% 1.9% 1.9% 3.1% 3.4% 3.2% 0.7%
% Contrib. to Cap.Expenditure 44.4% 56.6% 78.2% 90.9% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
4. Proiect Implementation
c) Appraisal vs. Actual - Critical Financial Indicators for the Period 1986-1992
mmewwmwwwwww Appraisal -- ss==- ==-- s n= Actual
Variable or Indicator Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum Average
Cash (Billion Won) 34 286 167 46 242 149.25
Operating Income on Saler 28.7% 33.5% 30.1% 31.9% 37.6% 34.2%
Net Income on Sales 23.7% 29.3% 27.8% 21.4% 29.1% 26.1%
% Income before Tax on Zquity 16.8% 24.8% 18.7% 17.2% 26.8% 22.2%
Debt Service Ratio 1.9 9.0 5.7 2.7 3.6 3.15
Days Accounts Receivable 48 48 48 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Debt on Debt plus Equity 16.8% 43.5% 27.4% 59.4% 73.1% 64.3%
Contrib. to Capital Expenditure 56.3% 97.8% 89.6% n.a. n.a. n.a.
o%
5. Proiect Costs and Financina
a) Project Costs - Appraisal
Project Components Local Foreign Total % of Local Foreign Total %
------- (Won Billion)------- Base ------- (USS Million)------- Foreign
LAND ACQUISITION 988.02 0.00 988.02 74.4% 1,122.75 0.00 1,122.75 0.0%
For Housing 910.40 0.00 910.40 68.6% 1,034.55 0.00 1,034.55 0.0%
For Industrial Sites 77.62 0.00 77.62 5.8% 88.20 0.00 88.20 0.0%
LAND DEVELOPMENT 219.44 104.68 324.12 24.4% 249.37 118.95 368.32 32.3%
For Housing 175.13 83.54 258.67 19.5% 199.02 94.93 293.95 32.3%
For Industrial Sites 44.31 21.14 65.45 4.9% 50.35 24.02 74.37 32.3%
ENGINLERING & ADMINIS. 11.61 3.87 15.48 1.2% 13.19 4.40 17.59 25.0%
BASE COST - JAN/86 PRICES 1,219.07 108.55 1,327.62 100.0% 1,385.31 123.35 1,508.66 8.2%
PHYSICAL CONTINGENCIES 60.95 5.43 66.38 5.0% 69.27 6.17 75.44 8.2%
PRICE CONTINGENCIES 166.99 14.02 181.01 13.6% 244.45 20.48 264.93 7.7%
TOTAL COST 1,47.01 12 8 .00 1.575.01 118.6% 1.699.03 150.00 1.849.03 8.1_
b) Project Costs - Actual
Project Component. Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
------- (Won Billion) ------- ------- (US$ Million)-------
LAND ACQUISITION 2,845.10 0.00 2,845.10 4,039.94 0.00 4,039.94
For Housing 2,583.06 0.00 2,583.06 3,685.10 0.00 3,685.10
For Industrial Sites 262.04 0.00 262.04 354.84 0.00 354.84
LAND DEVELOPMENT 285.78 198.87 484.65 514.64 147.35 661.99
For Housing 174.38 121.35 295.73 309.76 89.91 399.68
For Industrial Sites 111.40 77.52 189.92 204.88 57.44 262.31
ENGINEERING & ADMINIS. 49.16 2.28 51.44 70.40 2.65 73.05
TOTAL COST 3,180.04 201.15 3,381.19 4,624.98 150.00 4,774.98
5. Proiect Costs and FInancing
c) Project Costs by Years - Appraisal vs. Actual
(Us$ MILLION)
--------------- Appraisal--------------- 
-------------- Actual--------------
Project Components 1986 1987 1988 1989 1986 1987 1988 1989
LAND AcOQUISITION 248.64 267.54 290.17 316.40 268.63 386.66 604.03 2,044.55
For Housing 215.35 239.13 263.68 316.40 220.76 292.23 492.43 1,994.16
For Industrial Sites 33.29 28.41 26.51 0.00 47.87 94.43 111.60 50.39
LAND DEVELOPMENT 96.60 92.88 87.57 91.27 109.75 114.30 148.02 190.73
For Housing 80.64 65.80 69.51 78.00 82.74 70.79 74.97 114.93
For Industrial Sites 15.96 27.08 18.06 13.27 27.02 43.51 73.06 75.80
ENGINEZRING & ADmINISTRATION 4.39 4.43 4.44 4.33 n.a. 14.97 20.83 33.73
BASE COST - JAN/86 PRICZS 349.63 364.85 382.18 412.00 
- - - -
PHYSICAL CONTINGENCIZS 17.48 18.24 19.11 20.60 - - - -
PRICC CONTINGENCIES 8.70 40.50 81.01 134.72 
- - - -
TOTAL COST 375.81 423.59 482.30 567.33 378.38 515.94 772.88 2,269.01 f
d) Project Financing - Appraisal vs. Actual
----------- Appraisal ----------- 
-------------- Actual------------
Local Foreign Total Share Local Foreign Total Share
-------- (US$ Million) -------- 
-------- (US$ Million)-------
Bank Loan 0.0 150.0 150.0 8% 0 150.0 150.0 4%
Other Loans 30.0 0.0 30.0 2% 1,360.63 0.00 1,360.63 35%
KLDC's Contribution 1,669.0 0.0 1,669.0 90% 2,425.58 0.00 2,425.58 62%
TOTAL 1,699.0 150.0 1,849.0 100% 3,786.21 150.00 3,936.21 100%
6. Pr2iect Results
a) Direct Benefits
(thousand square eters)
Appraisal Actual
1986 1987 1988 1989 1986 1987 1988 1989
Land Acquisition 8,975 9,115 9,601 8,712 9,510 11,931 12,421 27,900
For Housing 6,000 6,600 7,260 8,712 5,431 6,560 8,639 22,711
For Industrial Sites 2,975 2,515 2,341 0 4,079 5,371 3,782 5,189
Land Development 9,792 10,129 9,170 9,277 6,774 6,965 8,069 13,607
For Housing 7,478 6,202 6,552 7,352 4,705 3,231 2,780 7,245
For Industrial Sites 2,314 3,927 2,618 1,925 2,069 3,734 5,289 6,362
Land Supply 8,222 10,497 9,594 9,288 9,328 13,595 12,972 26,074
For Housing 5,122 6,149 6,281 6,774 6,759 8,765 7,080 21,038
For Industrial Sites 3,100 4,348 3,313 2,514 2,569 4,830 5,892 5,036
b) Studies
Following studies were completed under the project and were financed by the government (KLDC).
1. Financial Management
2. Land Pricing
3. Demand Analysis
4. Staff Training
5. Performance Oriented Goals
6. Projec Reuls
c) Fnancil Results
() KLDC' Sl_ Shet a o Dcemr31 cat Appraial (163-1)
(BIon Won)
106S 1664 1965 10ow 1#67 lo6 1#60 1600 1661 1992
TOTALCURRENT ASSETS 72.396 63.90s 64271 177.052 100.811 11U.812 248.110 291.426 348.535 400.751
Cash and Banks 3.527 4.371 11.316 114.772 33.819 1115.80 17J31 204.360 246.526 281.200
Reowhleeon LAnd Sold (naq 40.168 33.617 36.ee 51110.6 64.403 70.300 73.076 34.305 90.163 111.673
Mwao,tmc SEcurhti 25.80s 23.663 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
Advics to Contractos 1.64 1.792 0.777 0.777 0.304 0.640 O.U2 0.027 0.073 1.021
Odh Curnrnt Aaes 1.166 0.466 3.4ss 1.823 1.323 1.U23 1.U2s 1.U23 1.323 1.823
TOTAL LAND INVENTORY 640.819 340.418 1,047.31 1.158.572 1,243.0 1361.458 1,473.2j 1 1,,44.86 1,83.0.2 2,079.80
InvntorsysopIng Land 401.503 516.928 700.636 818.791 8ss.269 1,004.472 1,1138.93 1,303.774 1,513.369 1,753.067
Inventoky Transction LAnd 245.226 323.400 33666s1 337.731 346.390 34e.se6 334.323 338.082 323.603 326.152
NET FIXED ASSETS 4.270 4.099 3.671 3.00 3.742 3-907 4.063 4.131 4.291 4.384
Fibed Aeet In Operadon 4.767 4.743 4.53s 4.738 5.033 5.438 5.838 623 6.60;a3 7.0s3
Accumnulded Depreciadon 0.407 0.644 0.867 1.070 1.206 1.631 1.735 2.067 2.347 2.664
OTHERASSETS 34.272 31.773 11.718 13.730 14.030 14.340 14.749 15.077 15.801 16.518
Reclvebles on Land Sold (net) 27.619 5.623 1.073 3.140 3.ss0 3.700 4.100 4.437 5.221 6.878
Restricted Sank Depost 0.000 18.301 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Othr Asets 6.6a3 7.40 10.640 10.640 10.640 10.640 10.640 10.640 10.640 10.640
TOTAL ASSETS 757.750 940.198 1.115.977 1351.066 1.362.300 1.158.517 1.740.17S 1.957.6 2.205.e40 2.501.462
1OTALCURRENT LABILMES 224.087 278.139 9. 471.828 336.610 383.436 366.os 422.314 467.231 520.730
AdMeced RPeeved 114.565 166.003 132.470 170.20 177.477 101.332 215.8U1 230.455 281.113 325.112
Othe Accounbt Payable 17.142 31.236 62.037 64.203 67.006 70.463 73.975 77.674 31.563 36.636
Incom Taxee Payable 0.384 10.482 21.464 10.86 17.330 22.902 23.100 27.34 31.504 36.926
Curent Maturitie Long-Term Debt 41.496 39.815 77.708 217.465 74.606 6.608. 53.346 6.340 73.056 73.056
OTHER LIABIUTIES 3.303 4.205 5.597 6.900 8.413 10.156 12.063 14.194 16.595 19.316
Accured Severan IndemnitIs 3.303 4.205 5.507 6.000 3.413 10.16e 12.062 14.104 16.650 10.316
Other Uablte 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LONG-TERM DEBT (net) 276.458 366.038 354.320 256.811 24.094 277.014 315.050 285.034 276.125 268.7a2
TOTAL LIABILITIES 603.848 638.382 653.506 735.637 620.717 670.806 84.060 722.442 750.051 808.808
TOTAL EQUITY 253.911 301.816 462.381 e16.52 732.582 887.913 104.111 1.235.097 1.445. 1,f92.f4
CapIt 203.943 213.943 228.943 248.943 248.943 248.943 248.943 248.043 248.043 248.043
RetaIned Earnings & Reerve 4s.968 87.873 233.438 366.56 4s3.63s 638.970 797.172 986.154 1,190.756 1.443.711
TOTAL EQUITY & LIABILITIES 757.759 040.198 1,115.977 1.351.066 1,362.299 1.558.518 1,740.176 1,957.639 2,205.80 2.501.462
6. Project Resultc
c) Financial Results
(hi) KLDCs Actual Balance Sheet as of Dceomber 31 (1093-1W00)
(Billion Won)
1903 1984 1906 1906 1987 1968 1989 1990
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 72.396 63.90 54.271 177.052 120.814 183.96 26. 9 37.333
Cash and Banks 3.527 4.371 11.S16 114.772 46.172 113.569 106.704 242.365
PRoclable on Land Sold (net 40.188 33.017 38.60e 60.660 62.479 62.096 89.467 681.341
Marketable Securitles 26.803 23.66 0.020 0.020 n.a. n.n. n.a. n.a.
Advance to Contraclor 1.6 .702 0.777 0.777 0.311 6.870 3.546 6.333
Other Curre Ass 1.1e6 0.466 3.406 1.823 2.662 2.438 1.147 7.294
TOTAL LAND INVENTORY 60.819 U0.418 1.040.31 1.160.672 1422.6 1.801.9 3362.720 3.449.1
Invenory Developin Land 401.0S 516.926 700.162 818.791 n.e n.L nA. n.e
Ieoy Transactc Land 245.220 323.400 336.661 837.781 na. n.a. nfL n.a.
NET FDED ASSETS 4270 4.00 3.671 3.t 6.33 7.217 12.365 23.113
Fixed Asst In Opwrston 4.767 4.743 4.536 4.76 6.86 8.770 14.466 na.
Accum.dde Doprecion 0.497 0.644 0.067 1.076 1.228 1.663 2.133 na.
OTHER ASSETS .m 31.773 11.718 13.780 12.172 15.099 J0.396 69.90
RAc_oslshle on Lnd Sold (ne) 27.619 5.523 1.078 3.140 naL naL n.a. n.aL
ids Bank Depo s 0.000 16.301 0.000 0.000 7.812 110.86 19.060 3e.2e7 2
Othr Asses 6.663 7.949 10.40 10.640 4.360 4.233 11.326 23.722
TOTALASSETS 757.780 940.11981 1.115. 1.361.066 1. 9 2.007.7 3.e3. 4.4e.6t
TOTAL CURRENT UABIUTIES 224.087 278.126 2s3.679 4711.822 43.167 814.312 2.15.123 1991.147
Advanced ReoeIved 164.565 106.603 132.470 170.206 306.26 10.482 11,585.68 11.00.851
Othr Aocounts Payable 17.142 31.239 62.037 64.206 37.398 51.64 120.16U 224.482
Inco Taxe Payble 0.814 10.482 21.464 10.868 20.062 26.070 47.802 129.905
Currit Maturie" Long-Ten Debt 41.466 30.815 77.708 217.455 71.462 183.160 101.103 115.A74
Othr Current ULHiWe 28.07 39.5648 236.674 460.866
OTHER LIABIUTIES 4.206 5.807 6.e00 28.079 33.oz 31.619 41.821
Accred Seance Inde es 3.303 4.206 5.897 6so 8.466 11.A 14.966 27.462
Othr LbNkles 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.073 21.737 16.e64 14.360
LONG-TERM DEBT (net 276.458 3se.038 SU.320 260.811 445.053 382.491 486.f61 007.796
TOTALLABIUTIES 5038.4 68.362 853.60 735.537 930.280 13.432 2.671. 2.840.762
TOTAL EQUITY 253.911 301.816 462.361 616.520 633.127 777.330 ss4.e47 1.628.304
Cald 203.943 213.043 228.943 248.943 253.042 258.042 370.000 e60.000
Atd Eamrnings & aResee 49.068 87.873 233.43 3s6.56s 37.185 518.367 614.647 978.804
TOTAL EQUITY & LIABILTES 757.759 940.198 1.115.977 1.351.066 1,560.416 2,007.771 3,656.340 4.469.565
6. Project Results
c) Fnanwd Result
1) KLDC'c ncomeum mtatents For the Twelve Month. Endlng Decmber 31, at Apprate (1963-199
1963 1964 196S 106 1967 106 1969 1900 1901 1992
Total Lnd Acqueiukon - 000 oq m 146u 1,714 16.46e 11,476 1106 11.681 to .eo 116 12.622 13.676
Land Deve"onent 7,396 7,270 7.623 9,914 10,129 9,170 9,277 9,163 9,614 10,486
Lwrtd Rdevelopment 0 0 0 17 13 12 12 12 10 10
Land Supply 13.774 29.727 21,W66 13,071 13,907 13,116 12,832 12,673 12,730 13,410
Land Sold n.. 11,8I33 16,327 12,671 14,673 13,269 13,006 12,749 12,736 13,202
Total Supply - SEan Won 200.074 336.726 367.62 486.66 607.076 68.606 616.623 668.444 603.1t0 92t.802
Dv lp Land Suppted 113.612 221.706 246312 434.600 461.930 466.077 614.296 190.032 e64.692 606.200
Other Ld ASGuldinge SuppNed 96.8e2 116.020 112.240 62.066 66.148 78.726 102.326 68.412 118.588 12.602
Sols of Land - Bllion Won 119.936 181.023 300.466 463.24e 489.214 634.012 692.901 640.161 762.996 47.636
Deveope Land ise I6.2 107.756 317.096 376.363 427.762 461.400 408.617 66z690 e4s.61 760.262
Othr Land A Penow. 8ulld. Sold 103.780 72.321 61.150 76.413 60.931 70.964 92.437 76.742 102.629 6467
Rent & Othr Itnomn 0.934 0.s68 1.220 1.460 1.601 1.868 1.647 1.729 1.816 1.906
Coetoat Sale - Illion Won 97.804 132.299 220.3eo 292.946 334.662 360.396 412.364 44U.607 621.169 686418
Cost of Develop Land Sold 11.811 81.883 1e3296 222.606 20.342 303.227 337.996 379.439 436.622 617.490
Cost of Other Land Sold 86.664 4s.887 66.726 70.000 47.946 66.763 73.960 60.603 82.023 68.373
Servo Ote Costs 0.329 0.629 0.307 0.349 o.3m 0.406 0.439 0.476 0.614 0.666
ROtS PIRT 22.132 48.724 179.106 160.301 164.662 173.616 180.617 190.664 221.836 261.217
SeltlIg & Amnin Flip -L Wn 6.718 6.776 7.870 8.420 9.014 0.763 10.697 11.412 12.474 1S660 
Per le (alminleIjate) 3.214 .167 2400 &762 4.000 4.312 4.618 4.9s0 & 11 617 L
Seeran Exis 0.770 6.406 0.666 0.581 o.e69 0.813 0.916 1.000 1.166 1.203
Overhed 2.281 2.43s Z702 2.084 3a127 88.68 3.6S 3.801 4.1166 4.602
Othe EOease 0.303 0.576 0.60 0.94 0.96813 1.069 1.172 1.51 1.626 1.716
_epS'on 0.170 0.197 e.s 0.200 0.220 0.236 0.264 0.272 290 0.306
OPEPATINS 0NO0E 16.414 41.948 171.436 161.U1 14L6St 16e863 169.920 11U.22 21t.362 247.667
ohe 11iNne 19.118 26.064 32. 31.0 8 ".0 42.062 46.243 61.003 61.604 e0139
terest ont selse e .6 4294 29.0'1 26.9 28.214 86.67 30.260 4aa7 47.662 86346
Oter ntet 8.121 7.067 8.966 .026 1.781 1.817 1.9040 2003 2.10Z 2.200
ot hkmw 1.011 a703 8O0O s e.6 3866 4.288 6.088 6.422 Z6Ss 2.566
Ote Evensee 22.26 10.296 36e.66 30.164 61.060 29.066 360e43 26.061 26.710 23.767
hntret Ep-ne 20.0es 1s.204 24.94 20.164 60.026 27.374 36.07 2ae6s 27.487 22.442
O Exp 2.537 0.092 11.071 1.000 1.086 1.062 1.136 1.192 1.262 1.315
Inome Sebers Tam 11.90 47.716 1e6.616 162.606 133.37t 17e6.8 179.220 214.194 342.367 24.04s
_toM Txes 1.016 10.63 21.464 19.86 17.330 22.9s2 23.290 27.648 31.04 se2
Net Io 10.888 37.133 146.062 132.040 116.089 136.667 16.921 164.348 210.833 247.123
Oprahng _ monSWes 12.9% 23.2% 42.9% 33.6% 29.7% 30.7% 28.7% 29.4% 29.1% 29.2%
&e Pfolton als. 16.6% 29% 44.6% 364% 31.6% 32.6% 30.4% 31.2% 30.8% 30.8%
Not Im on Imes 0.1% 20.6% 36.3% 29.3% 23.7% 29.8% 2.3% 29.1% 28.0% 29.2%
Incom Belom TaxEqulty 4.7% 18% 361.0% 24.8% 16.2% 19.0% 17.1% 17.8% 16.% 16.8%
6. Project Resuhe - c) Flnanclal Reaul
Iv) KLDCvs Actual incoFe Statementc Far the Twelo Months Ending Decmber 31 (1983-1990)
1963 1064 1965 lose 1967 19i8 1969 1990
Total Land AcqulhWon - 000 cq m 14 611 11 714 16 4S8 11 476 16 004 13 794 31.032 p.270
Land Deebpmenl 7,396 7,27 7,623 9,914 6,6 6,060 13,607 268l11
Land Rrd* voplmnt 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0
Land Supply 13,774 2Z727 21,636 13,071 23.612 16,247 29,071 36,740
Land gold na. 11,685 16,327 12,571 na. n..4 na. na.
Totd SupplV - Blllon Won 209.674 338.726 367.662 48.666 661.726 6u.029 2.77e.070 3.62.
Dveoped Land SuppNlsd 113.182 221.706 245.312 4S4.600 n. n.a. na. na.
Oter Land A Buling Suppild 96SL2 11I.020 112.240 62.086 n.a. n..6 na. n.a.
81e. of Land - Nlilon Won 119.906 l6.023 300.406 453.246 360.406 479.451 713.319 3.822.890
Devloped Land Sal" 16.222 107.766 J17.096 S76.365 269.289 3e4.706 661.366 745.447
Other Land A Renew. BuNd. Sod 103.760 72.321 61.160 78.413 110.467 113.636 160.898 127.67
Pont &Othw Irome 0.964 0.908 1.220 1.450 0.662 1.211 1.056 1.010
On-Going Land n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.86 n.a. na. 2048.66
Cost of Sale. - lilloan Wan 07.864 132.290 220.360 292.946 247.243 304.604 422.367 2.908.720
Cost of Developed Land Sod 11.611 61.63 163.206 m 162262 226.334 34e.e25 410.678
Cost of Othr Land Sold 865J4 49.887 66.726 70.000 64.166 77.631 74.968 65.874
Servose & Othar Cofst 0.320 0.629 0.337 0.340 0.7 0.630 0.764 0.994
CostofOn-aolngLandSaid n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. na. n.e. n.e 2.441.183
GROSS PROFIT 22.132 48.724 179.106 180.301 133.165 174.947 290.062 914.161
Siling &Admln. Expenes -nc bon 6.718 6.776 7.670 8.420 11.864 16.606 23.074 28.963 
Personnsl (AdmInistrathte) 3.214 S.167 3.400 3.762 4.107 6.069 8.036 n.a.
Sswranos Expansc 0.770 0.406 0.686 0.601 0.683 1.806 1.648 n.a. W
Ovsrh.d 2.281 2.430 2.702 2.934 6.960 7.191 11.021 n.a. 
Othcr Expnssa 0.303 0.676 0.660 0.924 0.68 1.066 1.703 n.a.
Deprsciation 0.170 0.107 0.223 0.209 0.308 0.373 0.866 n.a.
OPERATING INCOOtE 16.414 41.948 171.436 161.681 121.301 16U.442 267.678 887.196
Otherlnoon 19.118 26.064 32.030 31.088 43.076 74.631 71.616 77.341
Fntsrcst on Sale. PRsclvabls 0.066 14,204 20.011 26.000 n.a. n.a n.a. n.a.
Other Insrset 8.121 7.067 6.986 3.026 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.s.
Other noons 1.011 3.703 3.000 3.060 n.e. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Othaf Expenses 22.6 19.296 36.966 30.164 66.176 67.447 76.873 180.264
interest Expcse 20.060 19.04 24.964 29.164 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Expsn_e 2.637 0.002 11.071 1.000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
mmc, slors Tame 11.906 47.718 166.616 162.605 109.201 176.562 283.620 764.276
heom Taxns 1.018 10.668 21.484 109.66 27.024 36.206 64.811 146.070
Not Icome 10.868 37.133 146.062 132.940 81.277 130.320 198.709 639.206
Operthng hom an Sles 12.9% 23.2% 42.9% 33.6% 31.9% 33.0% 37.6% 23.2%
Ae Proit on Sale 18.6% 2609% 44.8% 364% 36.0% 36.6% 40.6% 23.0%
Not hnam on Sals 9.1% 20.5% 36.3% 29.3% 21.4% 20.1% 27.0% 11.7%
hIncome UIayEqultY 4.7% 16$% 36.o% 24.8% 17.2% 22.6% 26.6% 48.2%
7. Status of Maior Covenants
Section Subject Status
LOAN AGREEMENT
2.02 (b) Borrower to open and maintain in dollars a special Complied with.
account in the Korea Exchange Bank on terms and
condition. satisfactory to the Bank.
3.03 Borrower to approve the Sub-projects in accordance Complied with. Improved
with criteria agreed with the Bank. evaluation procedures were
established in 1986 and were
reviewed and updated based on
experience with new sites.
3.04 Borrower to review annually with the Bank the progress Annual reports were provided to
achieved in the implementation of the institutional the Bank. Implementation was
development program included in the Policy Statement. good.
The first such review to take place not later than
October 31, 1986.
3.05 Commencing on February 28, 1987 Borrower to furnish Projections were prepared
annually to the Bank, its projections of development satisfactorily with support of a
programs, including financial projections and Bank's consultant. However, it
monitoring indicators for the next five years for was diecovered that computers
Bank's review and comments. were incompatible in Hangul and
thus management could not make
use of the projections. But by
the end of the project,
projections in Hangul were
completed.
5.01 The Borrower to maintain records and accounts and have Complied with. Ministry of
its accounts and financial statements and the Special Construction (MOC) maintained
Account audited annually and furnish tc the Bank records. Audited accounts were
certified copies of its financial statements and audit submitted to the Bank on
report, six months after the end of each fiscal year. schedule.
5.02 The Borrower not to incur any debt, unless the net Debt service ratio was maintained
revenues of the Borrower for the fiscal year at 1.6. KLDC's strong financial
immediately preceding the date of such incurrence or position led to a proposal to
for a past twelve-month period be at least 1.3 times reduce the prices of some types
the estimated maximum debt service requirements of the of land sold. (was this done).
Borrower for any succeeding fiscal year on all debts, KLDC also launched a major public
including the debt to be incurred. relations campaign to acquaint
the public with the true costs
and profits of their activities.
Schedule 1, 1. Loan amount to meet 60% of expenditures for each civil Complied with. The full loan
works contract. amount of US$ 150 million was
disbursed against civil works.
Schedule 1, 2. No withdrawals to be made for expenditures for civil
works contracts costing less than US$4,000,000.
GUARANTEE AGREEMENT
2.01 The guarantor promptly to provide the Borrower with Complied with.
funds needed to meet expenditures.
POLICY STATEMENT
Review land pricing policies and price allocation Study completed in June 1987. Recommendations
procedures. regarding overhead, interest during construction,
separated pricing for land for public housing, etc.
were implemented. Land for low income housing was
sold at cost.
Implement long-term financial planning and corporate In addition to financial projections, a
planning. comprehensive long-term plan was prepared every two
years by consultants and university professors. U
Implement improved site evaluation procedure. Study completed in January 1986 and implemented.
Study to improve financial management. Study completed in June 1987; it provided
recommendations on project accounts, land, accounts
payable and cost allocation.
Implement computerization of accounts. Computerized accounting was implemented by end-1989.
Review implementation of performance-oriented goals. Study completed in December 1986 and implemented in
stages.
Maintain training programs and establish a training Numerous in-house and overseas training programs
center. were implemented.
8. Use of Bank Resources
a) Bank/Staff Consultant Inputs
(Staff Weeks)
PROJECT CYCLE BANK FISCAL YEAR
FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 TOTAL
Preparation 0.2 0.7 34.0 34.9
Appraisal 8.6 8.6
Negotiations 9.2 9.2
Loan Processing 9.0 9.0
Supervision 2.5 7.1 10.3 7.6 1.9 0.1 29 5 w
Project Administration 0.3 0.1 0.4 l
Project Completion 0.5 9.3 9.8
TOTAL 0. 2 0.7 63.3 7.4 10.3 7.7 1.9 0.6 9.3 101 4
8. Use of Bank Resources
b) Bank Missions
TERMS OF PERFORMANCE HISS ION
TYPE OF MISSION REFERENCE MISSION DATES STAFF RATINGS REPORTS
Identification 11/13/84 Nov. 26-Dec. 12, Economist
1984 Financial Analyst
Engineer
Preparation 08/06/85 Aug. 12-20, 1985 Financial Analyst-3 Project Brief
Economist 10/04/85
Engineer
Appraisal 10/28/85 Nov. 11-28, 1985 Sr. Financial Analyst Aide Hemoire
Sr. Engineer 11/27/85
Economist Issues Paper
12/02/85
Supervision I 05/30/86 June 18-19, 1986 Sr. Financial Analyst 1
Sr. Engineer 08/06/86
Engineer l
Supervision II 03/04/87 March 25-27, 1987 Sr. Financial Analyst 1 04/21/87 &
I___________ __Sr. Enaineer 04/24/87
Supervision III 09/29/87 September 1987 Sr. Financial Analyst n.a.
Supervision IV 01/19/88 February 6-9, 1988 Sr. Financial Analyst 1 03/17/88
Supervision V /88 May 2-5, 1988 Sr. Financial Analyst 1
_____________________ Sr. Engineer 05/27/88
Supervision VI 1/88 October 24-27, Sr. Financial Analyst 1
______ 1988 Economist 11/09/88
Supervision VII /89 Hay 2-3, 1989 Sr. Economist 1 05/07/89 &
I______________ Engineer _ 06/25/89
